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THE TAKINGS CLAUSE: A PROTECTION TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASES*
Mary A. Viviano**
I. INTRODUCTION
The petroleum industry locates and produces the oil and gas
reserves so necessary to the operation of all facets of our modem society.
To that end, it explores the millions of acres of federally owned lands,
primarily in the western United States, that represent the last remaining
potential for significant field discovery. The stated public policy of the
United States is to make these public lands available for mineral leasing
in an effort to reduce our energy dependence on foreign sources.1 Even
so, the lower oil prices of recent years have encouraged Americans to
increase oil consumption by 500,000 barrels daily, prompting the U.S.
Department of Energy to warn that foreign oil dependency could well be
at 50% within five years.2 Continued reliance on oil underscores the
need for accelerated exploration and development of domestic reserves.
On Federal lands, mineral leasing is authorized by the 1920 Mineral
Lands Leasing Act.3 If the lands have never been leased before, an oil
company may acquire the rights to explore for oil and gas on the leased
public lands. This right is contingent upon the company complying with
the 1920 Act and subsequently passed statutes regarding public lands
* Winning essay of the Twelfth Annual National Energy Law and Policy Institute Essay
Competition.
** Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado. B.A., 1982, Regis College; J.D.,
1988, University of Denver.
1. Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620
(10th Cir. 1987).
2. Forsgren and Oliveria, Oil and Gas in Wilderness Areas: The Need for Compromise, W.
WILDLANDs, Fall 1987, at 16.
3. 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-287 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
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and the environment. Once the right is acquired, the company may typi-
cally use as much of the surface as necessary to fulfill the lease's stated
purpose.
Many hundreds of thousands of dollars in exploration costs are in-
curred by a company prior to the decision to drill a well on federal
lands.4 This exploration may be at odds with the environmental con-
cerns mandated by legislation adopted subsequent to the lease approval.
Such legislation may demand a higher level of protection to surrounding
surface resources than was contemplated or demanded at the time of
lease issuance. As a result, government action taken subsequent to leas-
ing may significantly restrict the exploration and development activity
allowed on the leased lands. These restrictions may alter lease rights so
as to give rise to the claim that a valuable property right has been ad-
versely affected or even "taken" by subsequently adopted but retroac-
tively applied federal law.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 19681 for example, can interfere
with a mineral lessee's use and enjoyment of property rights. A river's
subsequent designation as "wild and scenic" may permanently preclude
bridges or other construction necessary for access to the wellsite. The
right of ingress and egress is prohibited on the federal lease while the
river designation review takes place, and permission to enter the drillsite
may be withdrawn permanently if the river becomes designated as "wild
and scenic." There is no "savings clause" for previously created, valid
existing uses in this act. Only a constitutional attack can be mounted by
the lessee in response to retroactive application of this law to the pre-
existing property right.
Wilderness nonimpairment standards adopted pursuant to the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)6 may render
previously issued federal oil and gas leases useless. In Rocky Mountain
Oil and Gas Association v. Watt,7 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit interpreted the nonimpairment standard to apply to pre-existing
leases, despite a savings clause in the act exempting existing mining and
grazing use. The only leases immunized from FLPMA's provisions were
those with actual "on the ground" activity on the date of enactment (Oc-
tober 21, 1976).8
4. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 741 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. See also Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
[Vol. 24:43
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A more difficult and interesting question is raised by restrictions im-
posed due to agency noncompliance with an act's procedural require-
ments. The Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management's (BLM)
noncompliance with the procedural provisions of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)9 and the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA)' ° has produced difficulties for mineral lessees. Post-leasing
activities have been suspended while the courts wrestle with the BLM's
alleged failure to comply with these acts by leasing national forest lands
without preparation of full environmental impact statements and biologi-
cal assessments. The BLM leased lands based upon Forest Service find-
ings that leasing alone has no significant impact on the environment.
However, the courts are not in agreement as to whether leasing alone has
a significant effect on the environment. Two circuit courts have recently
invalidated the agency action11 and one has upheld it."2 The mineral
lessees remain uncertain as to the validity and status of their property
while the courts decide if the act of leasing alone constitutes an irretriev-
able commitment of resources. If so, the agency must evaluate the envi-
ronmental effects of its action at this point of commitment. Otherwise,
the BLM has violated the procedural mandates of both NEPA and
ESA.' 3 In both Sierra Club and Conner, the courts validated those
leases issued with no surface occupancy (NSO) stipulations, while invali-
dating those leases containing only restrictions on surface occupancy
stipulations (non-NSO). The reason for this distinction is that future en-
vironmental danger to the lands by a lessee's drilling and mineral devel-
opment activities could not be completely prohibited on non-NSO leases;
the activities could merely be conditioned. The NSO leases, however,
preclude surface disturbing activities entirely. 4
Of the 709 Federal leases covering 1.3 million acres in Flathead and
Gallatin National Forests at issue in Conner v. Burford, only 57 con-
tained NSO stipulations over their entire surface.1 The remedy adopted
9. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
11. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), superseding, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.
1988) (the superseding opinion amended the original by adding footnote 40); Sierra Club v. Peterson,
717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
12. Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th
Cir. 1987).
13. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414.
14. See generally McCrum, NEPA Litigation Affecting Federal Mineral Leasing and Develop-
ment, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7 (Spring 1986).
15. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447.
1988]
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by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was to add NSO stipula-
tions to the remaining 652 leases so that NSO stipulations applied over
the entire surface acreage. The court believed this remedy avoided the
"unnecessarily harsh result of completely divesting the lessees of their
property rights.' 16 The NSO stipulations are to remain in effect until the
Forest Service and the BLM comply with the procedural requirements of
NEPA and ESA.
The BLM has suspended the leases until all appeals are exhausted or
its compliance with the order is completed.17 This action protects the
lessee's interests by preserving the balance of the leases' primary terms
while the controversy is resolved. The Ninth Circuit's injunction against
any surface disturbing activity, however, instructs the agencies to ignore
the commitments embodied in the non-NSO leases already sold."8 These
commitments are critical to the lessee's property right. Compliance with
NEPA and ESA procedures may result in the BLM's inability to revali-
date all of these leases as originally issued. If so, the most reasonable
alternative will be for the BLM to permanently attach the NSO stipula-
tions to the offending leases when the suspension is lifted and their pri-
mary terms again begin to toll. Such an alteration to the lessee's
expectations by subsequent and permanent addition of NSO stipulations
to their leases constitutes a severe hardship to the lessees.
This article considers whether the takings clause of the United
States Constitution 9 has been violated when a NSO stipulation is perma-
nently imposed on an established, pre-existing property right that did not
contain an NSO stipulation. Of particular interest is whether this altera-
tion of private property expectations can occur as a result of agency non-
compliance with a statute's procedural requirements, when the private
party has acted in good faith. These questions require an examination of
the property right owned by the federal oil and gas lessee, the nature of
the government's power to impact that right, and the possible protection
afforded these property owners by the takings clause of the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution as most recently interpreted by
the Supreme Court.
16. Id. at 1461 n.50.
17. Memorandum from Director, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of Interior to
State Director, Montana Bureau of Land Management (July 9, 1985) (discussing interim action in
response to Conner v. Burford decision no. CV-82-42-BU).
18. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), superseding, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir.
1988).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
[Vol. 24:43
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 24 [1988], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol24/iss1/2
TAKINGS CLA USE
II. NATURE OF THE PROPERTY INTEREST IN A FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASE
A leasehold interest in federal mineral rights is considered a less
than fee interest estate in real property. Nonetheless, it is property
whose loss must be compensated if it is deemed "taken" for fifth amend-
ment purposes. 20 A leasehold interest is created by federal statutes such
as the 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act as administered by the United
States Department of the Interior through the BLM. A lease issued
under the act does not convey title to the land and is not considered a
vested right. Lessees must comply with the rules and regulations in effect
on the date of the lease and those duly adopted thereafter.2" The leases
are, however, immune from denial or extinguishment by the exercise of
secretarial discretion. They are property interests rather than mere ex-
pectancies. As property interests, they likely fall within valid existing
rights language protecting pre-existing legal interests from operation of
subsequently passed laws.22  These non-vested protectable property
rights may be regulated and their value diminished for proper public
23purposes.
The lease grants to the holder the exclusive right to drill for, re-
move, and dispose of the oil and gas under the leased lands for a primary
term of ten years and so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in
paying quantities. The lessee does not own the minerals in place, only
the rights to explore for them. Once production is established, the lessee
has the continuing right to produce the oil and gas until economic deple-
tion. The lease term is perpetuated over this period if the lessee adheres
to all other lease terms. Covenants to drill and reasonably develop are
stated or implied in a federal lease as obligations of the lessee.24
The leases at issue in Conner v. Burford contain numerous environ-
mental stipulations authored by both the Forest Service and the BLM,
limiting use of their surface in order to protect endangered and other
species, timber, and watershed. These "area specific" stipulations are, in
addition to standard stipulations, seeking to minimize disturbance of the
20. Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 949 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
21. See Laitos and Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources,
11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 14 (1987).
22. Solicitor's Opinion M-36910 (Supp.), 88 Interior Dec. 909, 912 (1981).
23. Id.
24. See Non-competitive public domain lease Form 3110-1, llth ed. March 1977 Serial No.
BLM M-43272, covering lands in Flathead County, Montana. See generally E. KuNTz, CASES AND
MATERIALS IN OIL AND GAS LAW (1986).
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surface. The agencies require approval of a site specific plan by the Min-
erals Management Service (MMS) in consultation with the surface man-
aging agency prior to any surface disturbing operation .2  At issue in
these procedural challenges to NEPA and ESA regulations, is whether
such stipulations, taken as a whole, allow the agencies to later deny or
only reasonably condition permits for site specific activity.
An NSO stipulation attached at lease issuance means that the lessee
agrees to be subject to the agencies' absolute authority to prohibit surface
use. The lessee of an NSO lease, sometimes called a contingent right
lease, acquires no vested right to enter the surface to develop the leased
minerals. Instead, he acquires an exclusive priority right to explore,
should it ever be allowed, for the extent of the lease's primary term.
Although some case law has held to the contrary,26 there is little doubt
that issuing leases with NSO stipulations is constitutional so long as the
lessee is clearly informed of the limited property right he is acquiring.27
An NSO stipulation applied retroactively by the BLM to a non-NSO
lease, however, raises a serious takings question.
III. THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY INTERESTS
The government's authority to regulate private property interests is
derived from the property clause and commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.2 This "police power" may be exercised to benefit
the health, safety, and welfare of the people. This concept of public good
or public purpose is broad enough to encompass the federal government's
power to make laws that affect private rights in natural resources.29 The
government may redirect the benefits and burdens of economic life for
public purposes despite upsetting otherwise settled private expecta-
tions.30 In regulating leases of publicly owned minerals, Congress exer-
cises both the proprietary powers of a landowner and the police powers
25. Federal oil and gas lease M-43272, supra note 24, attachment 3, Form 3109-5 (August
1973). See generally Burton, Federal Leasing-Restrictions and Extensions, 28 RocKY MTN MIN. L.
INST. 1133 (1982).
26. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Wyo. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1982).
27. McCrum, supra note 14.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 17; U.S. CONST. art IV § 3 cl. 2.
29. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2, at 590 n.10 (2d ed. 1988).
30. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
[Vol. 24:43
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of a legislature.31 Congress may prescribe rules necessary for the conser-
vation of natural resources.
Laws in effect at the time of lease issuance are deemed incorporated
into the lease terms. The lessee's rights are also subject to subsequently
enacted law, unless statutory protection is afforded via valid existing
rights exceptions. This clause in a statute excepts pre-existing property
rights from application of the new law. This limitation on the govern-
ment's power is often so narrowly construed, however, that the pre-ex-
isting property right is afforded little protection. Although the property
right is subject to the subsequently enacted law, an overly restrictive reg-
ulation could constitute a taking of the property.32 What is interesting
about the Conner facts is that the NSO stipulations are not retroactively
applied pursuant to subsequent law, but rather as the result of failure to
adhere to procedural requirements of existing law. In either instance, the
government's exercise of its power may give rise to a takings challenge.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AFFORDED PROPERTY RIGHTS
VIA THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states, in
part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."33  Three types of takings are implicitly recognized by
the courts. First is the government's intentional exercise of the power of
eminent domain through condemnation proceedings. Second is an unin-
tentional taking or inverse condemnation through physical invasion
where the government's intent is inferred. The third form of a taking of
private property occurs when the government, in exercising its police
power, so regulates property interests that they are deemed taken,
thereby requiring that compensation be paid to the private property
owner by the government.34 The difficulty in determining a "regulatory
taking" has been the subject of judicial controversy throughout most of
the twentieth century." In essence, it is a determination of whether the
"public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the consequences
of an exercise of state power in the public interest."'36
31. Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. See generally Comment, FLPMA's Wilderness Study Areas: Valid Existing Rights and the
Nonimpairment Standard, 5 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 69 (1983) (effect of FLPMA'S nonimpairment
standard as an interference with a mineral lessee's pre-existing rights).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. See L. Tribe, supra note 29, § 9-4, at 595-97.
35. Id. at 595.
36. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
1988]
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In the past, the Supreme Court has engaged in an ad hoe factual
inquiry on a case by case basis to determine if a regulation has consti-
tuted a "taking. ' 37 Recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate that
two different analytical approaches may be applied to a takings question.
The first approach uses a three-part balancing test which evolved from
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.3" This test is elabo-
rated upon in two 1987 cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis39 and Hodel v. Irving.4' The three-part test represents a
difficult threshold for the property owner to meet in a regulatory takings
challenge. The second approach, which is a two-part disjunctive test,
was originally set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon." This test was re-
cently relied on by the Court in the important 1987 case of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.'2 Under the Agins/Nollan test, a prop-
erty owner has a better chance of being compensated because satisfaction
of either part of the test constitutes a taking.
If an oil and gas lessee is faced with the subsequent addition of NSO
stipulations to pre-existing lease rights, these 1987 cases may support a
successful takings challenge. A discussion of the two analytical ap-
proaches and their application to a Conner-type mineral lessee con-
fronted with new, onerous stipulations that were added because of
agency failure to comply with procedural regulations will demonstrate
the differences in the tests.
A. The Penn Central/Keystone Analysis
The test enumerated in Penn Central analyzes three factors of par-
ticular significance in determining if a taking has occurred: 1) the char-
acter of the government action, 2) the economic impact of the regulation,
and 3) the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-
backed expectations.43
The rights claimed to have been taken in Penn Central were the air
rights to commercially develop above a train station. The development
37. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247 (1987); Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
38. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
39. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
40. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
41. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
42. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
43. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). This three-part test
was subsequently applied in Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3020 (1987); Hodel v. Irving 107 S.
Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247
(1987); and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
[Vol. 24:43
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was precluded by "historic landmark" legislation.' The Court, viewing
the property as a whole, decided that, although the air rights were eco-
nomically impacted, they were only one strand in the bundle of the
owner's property rights. The primary use of the property as a train sta-
tion was unaffected by the regulation. Although the claimant's invest-
ment-backed expectations had been diminished, their primary value as a
train station remained intact. The severity of the impact the law placed
on the claimant's parcel did not warrant compensation. A mere showing
that exploitation of a particular use of property has been denied is not a
taking.45 More importantly, the character of the government's action in-
volved the preservation of historic landmarks, which is a proper public
purpose. Laws that destroy or adversely affect recognized property inter-
ests or choose the destruction of one type of property for another more
valued by the public are still valid when an appropriate public purpose is
served.46
1. The Character of the Government Action
The character of the government action factor is elaborated upon in
Keystone.47 Here, a coal company claimed a taking by Pennsylvania's
subsidence act that required half the minerals be left underground to pre-
vent the surface from collapsing. The Court found the purpose of Penn-
sylvania's law was to arrest a significant threat to the public welfare and,
therefore, the character of the action leaned heavily against finding a tak-
ing. 48 A property owner is held to an implied obligation that the use of
his property will not be injurious to the community.49 The character of
the government's action is balanced against the economic and investment
implications to the property owner. Regulations that safeguard public
interests in health and the environment are most favorably weighed
against the resulting impact to the property owner. In Keystone,
although the company's expectation of profit had been diminished, the
mine could still be operated profitably while an important public purpose
was served.
44. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
45. Id. at 130.
46. Id. at 125.
47. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1245 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887)).
1988]
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2. The Economic Impact of the Regulation
To examine the economic impact of a regulation in light of Penn
Central, the Court considers the property as a "bundle of rights." Each
potential property use is considered a right in the bundle. The economic
impact of denying a potential use is then identified and balanced against
the remaining elements of the test.
The use denied in Keystone (coal mining) was analogized to that in
Andrus v. Allard." In Allard, provisions of the Eagle Protection Act
barred the sale of the feathers of endangered birds. The most valuable
right in the bundle of property rights (sale of eagle feather Indian arti-
facts) was prohibited. But other valuable rights of ownership remained,
such as possession and use for non-commercial purposes. The subsi-
dence act in Keystone merely prevented mining of a portion of the coal on
a given parcel. No use, however valuable to the property right, was com-
pletely denied.
Several cases have focused on the economic impact factor of the
Penn Central three-part balancing test. In Hodel v. Irving, a regulation
requiring small, fractionalized allotted Indian mineral interests to escheat
to the tribe rather than descend by intestacy or devise, was held to be a
taking. The ability to pass property to one's heirs was held an essential
right in the bundle of property rights.51 An ownership attribute deemed
"essential" by the court carries a much greater economic impact to the
property owner's rights than an attribute claimed "most valuable," as in
Allard. Taken alone, the regulation might not have been a taking, but
balanced against the character of the government regulation here, it did
not pass constitutional muster. It was unnecessary for the government to
completely abolish this essential right (descent and devise) to achieve its
purpose of arresting fractionalization of the interests. Less restrictive al-
ternatives were available to the government that were more closely tai-
lored to its purpose without relieving the property owners of their rights.
The right to exclude others is also an essential right. A physical
invasion of property outweighed the public purpose in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States. 2 Here an owner's governmentally approved dredging of a
channel from a private pond to a navigable bay resulted in the govern-
ment claiming public access to the pond under its commerce clause pow-
ers over navigable waters. The legal right to exclude others was held a
50. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
51. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (1987).
52. 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
[Vol. 24:43
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sufficiently important expectancy embodied in the concept of property
ownership to require the government to pay for such an easement. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 3 the court went even
further in concluding that a permanent physical occupation by the gov-
ernment is a taking regardless of the public interests served. In all these
instances, the nature of the economic impact on the property interest
resulted in a taking of private property.
3. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
The uses reasonably relied upon and expected to continue comprise
a property owner's investment-backed expectations. These expectations
are the third factor weighed in the Penn Central/Keystone test.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., a takings challenge was raised
against a regulation that required a company's trade secrets and proprie-
tary data to be disclosed to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
when applying for new product registration. The EPA's explicit assur-
ance of confidentiality formed the basis of a reasonable investment-
backed expectation of the company. After the regulation was amended
to exclude the Agency's assurance of confidentiality, however, the com-
pany could retain no such investment-backed expectation when it know-
ingly submitted the data in exchange for the economic advantage of
registration.
Property owners must be completely thwarted in their expectations
of profit. A mere diminution in value is insufficient to warrant a taking
and is usually mitigated by other benefits. This reciprocity of benefit
analysis is examined in Bowen v. Gilliard,55 where a regulation requiring
that outside child support payments be claimed as offsets to other public
aid benefits was challenged. The court held the diminution in value of
the child's interest was not substantial because it was offset by the addi-
tional benefits received. The extent of interference with investment-
backed expectations was not severe enough to give rise to a taking of the
property. Additionally, the child support was not considered a vested
property right to which future expectations could accrue.
4. The Penn Central/Keystone Test Applied to Conner
The character of the government's action in Conner is to protect the
53. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
54. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
55. 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987).
1988]
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environmental value of the property while procedural requirements are
fulfilled. Temporary application of the NSO stipulations to the leases
does not implicate a taking since the leases are suspended pending resolu-
tion of appeal or satisfaction of the procedural requirements. If the
leases are revalidated by the BLM with the NSO stipulation, however,
the takings issue arises. The BLM would be enforcing the purposes of
existing laws: NEPA and ESA. The important public policy of NEPA is
agency avoidance of piecemeal decision making that "may fail to ade-
quately consider the environmental ramifications of agency actions."56
ESA requires that agency action not jeopardize the continued existence
of any threatened or endangered species.5 7 These are valid public pur-
poses of sufficient importance to warrant retroactive application of the
NSO stipulations to the leases. As the Court stated in Penn Central, "in
instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that the 'health,
safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting par-
ticular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regula-
tions that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property
interests.""8
The next factor weighed is the economic impact of the regulation.
The economic impact to the mineral lessee whose oil and gas lease now
contains a NSO stipulation is severe. The primary purpose of the leases,
which is to drill for and produce hydrocarbons, has been thwarted by
denial of the surface access necessary to exploit the mineral estate. To
implicate a taking in line with Hodel or Kaiser Aetna, the plaintiff must
prove not only that the right is an essential right of the mineral lessee's
property rights, but also that the use right has been completely de-
stroyed. The ownership of the right to explore for the oil and gas is
similar to a water appropriation right where an owner does not own the
resource itself, but only the right to use (or explore for and produce) the
resource.59 Complete prohibition of such activity leaves little property
value remaining.
The argument can be made, however, that significant value attaches
56. Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620
(10th Cir. 1987).
57. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1988), superseding, 836 F.2d 1521
(9th Cir. 1988).
58. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978).
59. See generally Laitos, Constitutional Limits on Police Power Regulation Affecting the Exercise
of Water Rights, 16 CoLo. LAW. 1626 (1987); Israel, Emerging Federal and State Water Conflicts
Affecting Western Coal Development, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 157 (1980).
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to the lessee's "right of first refusal" to explore should the NSO stipula-
tions ever be lifted.' ° This is a valid residual right only if application of
the NSO stipulations is temporary. In Union Oil v. Morton 61 the court
reasoned that insofar as the government's denial of a permit to build a
drilling platform necessary to further develop an offshore federal oil and
gas lease was based upon factors that would not change in the foreseeable
future, a taking had occurred. Likewise, in Foster v. United States,6 z
where permanent denial of surface access on an air force base to the min-
erals below was deemed a taking, and in Utah v. Andrus,6 3 where the
court held that if access to property is indefinitely prohibited or if alter-
native access is unreasonably expensive, substantial takings questions are
raised. All of the federal leases challenged under NEPA and ESA are
within their primary terms and up to this time have not been accessible
for exploration. If the environmental reasons for attaching NSO stipula-
tions will not change within the leases terms, this "right of first refusal"
is not a remaining valuable right in the lessee's property rights.
Other remaining strands of the lessee's property rights include the
right to directionally drill from a non-NSO burdened lease to the under-
lying lands of the affected one and the right to pool an NSO lease into a
larger producing spacing unit with non-burdened leases.64 These may be
valuable remaining expectancies. Conner, however, involved 1.3 million
acres over 709 leases, thereby precluding the belief that for all practical
purposes adjacent lands would be so unburdened in all but a very few
instances. On the other hand, if NSO stipulations are only attached to a
few of the revalidated leases in accordance with NEPA and ESA proce-
dures, then this remains a viable and essential strand of the lessee's prop-
erty rights.
The leases as originally issued explicitly granted the rights to re-
stricted surface use for exploration of the oil and gas hydrocarbons be-
low. This grant forms the basis of the lessee's reasonable investment-
backed expectations. This expectancy has now been completely abol-
ished by the NSO stipulations, since no explorative activities can occur.
The lease's value as an inventory item or negotiating tool for the com-
pany is also severely depleted by the addition of NSO stipulations. The
60. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1461.
61. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
62. 607 F.2d 943 (Ct. CI. 1979).
63. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
64. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447 n.16.
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sui generis nature of an oil and gas lease distinguishes it from the Key-
stone facts where the company retains ownership of the minerals in place.
In contrast, once the lease's primary term is reactivated, the lessee must
expeditiously explore and produce or lose the property right altogether.
The thousands of dollars invested in a lease will never be recouped in oil
and gas revenues if surface access is denied by the implementation of the
NSO stipulations on a majority of the leases.
5. Results of the Application
If only a few leases are revalidated with NSO stipulations, then a
takings challenge cannot be sustained under the Penn Central/Keystone
three-part balancing test. Although the most valuable use is denied,
enough rights of the property right remain, such as the ability to direc-
tionally drill or pool the lease with non-NSO leases, that the economic
impact factor of the test is not met. Likewise, the lessee's investment-
backed expectations would not be completely diminished. Balanced
against the laudable public purpose of environmental protection, a tak-
ings challenge is not sustained.
Revalidating a majority of the leases with NSO stipulations will also
not sustain a takings challenge under the Penn Central/Keystone test.
The reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the lessees are com-
pletely diminished here, since the NSO stipulations preclude exploration
activity. Apparently, few rights in the property rights bundle remain.
The right to use the surface to explore for the minerals below may be an
"essential" use as well as the "most valuable" use of the property taken.
The abolishment of these rights, however, is insufficient to warrant a tak-
ing when balanced against the important public purpose served. Only in
instances of actual physical invasion of the property or an overbroad ap-
plication of the police power purpose have the economic impact and in-
vestment-backed expectation factors outweighed the character of the
government action in a takings challenge under the Penn Central/Key-
stone test. In Conner, the Government's purpose to protect the environ-
ment and endangered species from potential harm caused by mineral
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B. The Agins/Nollan Analysis
The takings analysis developed, in Agins v. City of Tiburon 6' and
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 66 is distinguishable from those
above in two very important ways. First, the takings test enumerated in
these cases is a two-part, disjunctive test: a law applied to particular
property effects a taking if it 1) does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, or 2) denies owners economically viable use of their
land.6 7 This particular framing of the takings analysis changes what a
property owner must prove. A property owner affected by a regulation
need not show that the overall balance of the Penn Central/Keystone test
produces a taking. Under Agins/Nollan the owner need only show either
that the regulation will not accomplish a valid goal, or that the regula-
tion denies all "viable use." In addition, Nollan raises the standard by
which the legitimate state interest is reviewed. The prohibition on the
property use must now substantially advance the police power purpose
served.68
Whether this "legitimate state interest" test of the Agins/Nollan
analysis is analytically the same as the "character of the government ac-
tion" factor of the Penn Central/Keystone test is unclear. Both focus,
however, on the police power purpose behind the regulation enacted.
Likewise, the alternative second test of Agins/Nollan that determines if a
regulation "denies all economically viable use," employs both the "rights
in the bundle" and "investment-backed expectation" criteria previously
explored in Penn Central/Keystone.
A state court recently applied the Agins/Nollan takings analysis in
Orion Corp. v. State.69 This case demonstrates the difficulties inherent in
the application of either the Penn Central/Keystone model or the Agins!
Nollan model. The case involved an alleged taking of privately owned
tidelands in Puget Sound by subsequent environmental legislation pre-
cluding development. The court first reviewed the regulatory purpose in
line with Keystone, assuming that a law enacted for public safety pur-
poses could never be subject to a takings challenge. Overcoming this
barrier, the court applied the Agins/Nollan two part disjunctive test.
This example highlights the complexity and overlap inherent in each of
65. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
66. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
67. Id. at 3146; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
68. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
69. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988).
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these quite different analyses that has not been resolved by the 1987
cases.
Both Agins and Nollan involve challenges to zoning and land use
regulations. In Agins, an ordinance restricting construction on certain
lands to one acre single family homes was held not to be a taking. In its
analysis, the court assumed that the "economically viable use" was re-
tained, because there were remaining uses which were not extinguished.
Neither the best use nor a fundamental attribute of ownership was com-
pletely prohibited. The court was also not concerned with the severe
economic diminution in value of the land, since some profitability expec-
tations remained.
The court then applied the second part of the disjunctive test - the
ends/means analysis. The court reviewed the government purpose
(preventing problems of excessive growth) and the law enacted (mini-
mum lot size) and found that the ordinance did substantially advance
legitimate government goals. This analysis did not require the nexus be-
tween the two be exact, however. A sufficient link existed between the
zoning regulation and the valid police power purpose of protecting resi-
dents from the ill effects of urbanization to uphold the law. A minimum
rationality review of the governmental purpose was sufficient.
This deference to the character of the government action was no
longer evident in Nollan. Here property owners challenged the state's
action requiring an easement of their beach front as a condition to grant-
ing a building permit on the property. The court first reasoned that such
a regulation did prohibit an essential use, the right to exclude others.
Considered alone, demanding the beach front easement was a taking.
Attaching it as a condition to the building permit, however, would be a
permissible exercise of police power if it was reasonably related to the
public burden created by the building construction.70
The condition was a valid exercise of police power only if the lack of
such a condition would justify denying the permit. Both the legitimate
state interest and the connection between that interest and the regulation
enacted were more carefully scrutinized by the court than ever before in
takings analysis. In Nollan that essential nexus between the two did not
exist, and the easement was deemed a regulatory taking.
This heightened scrutiny between the proffered public benefit and
the imposed condition signals a new respect for private property rights
70. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
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by the court. A premonition of this higher standard regarding the gov-
ernment's police power purpose can be seen in Hodel, where the regula-
tion was considered overbroad in extinguishing all devise and descent
rights when less drastic means would suffice.71 Apparently, the more
restrictive the economic and investment expectations placed on the prop-
erty owner are, the more closely tailored they must be to the government
purpose. Under the Agins/Nollan analysis, the lack of this nexus pro-
duces an unjust and uncompensated taking of property.
1. The Agins/Nollan Tests Applied to Conner
Despite the heightened standard of judicial review, the legitimate
state interest test of the Agins/Nollan analysis will not result in a taking
of the mineral lessee's property. The governmental purpose served by
the BLM retroactively applying the NSO stipulations to the leases is pro-
tection of the environment in compliance with procedural acts. The
NSO stipulations will achieve the same goal of protecting the environ-
ment that prohibition of the leases would have achieved. Additionally,
imposing the stipulations has a less disruptive impact on the property
rights than outright refusal to revalidate the leases.
But Agins and Nollan provide property holders with an alternative
ground to attack conditions--conditions may "take" property if they
deny economically viable use. In Conner v. Burford, the NSO stipula-
tions were not attached at lease issuance. Instead, in good faith the les-
sees expended numerous dollars acquiring non-NSO leases that were
subsequently burdened with NSO stipulations. Under the "deny eco-
nomically viable use" test of the Agins/Nollan analysis, the lessees may
prevail. This test entails consideration of both the uses prohibited and
the extent to which the investment-backed expectations of the property
owner are diminished.
2. Results of the Application
Should all or most of the leases be revalidated by the BLM with
NSO stipulations, a good case can be made that such action denied the
mineral lessees all economically viable use of their property. Such a case
would be based on the complete elimination of an essential right in their
property rights bundle. The inability to conduct any activity on the sur-
face prohibits their use of the property to explore for oil and gas entirely.
71. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84 (1987).
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No offsetting remaining uses exist, such as the ability to directionally
drill or pool the leases with non-NSO leases.
The lessee's investment-backed expectations must also be com-
pletely diminished. The lessee's expectations to drill and produce their
non-NSO leases have been completely extinguished by the retroactive ap-
plication of the NSO stipulations. There is also no opportunity to par-
ticipate in production revenues by pooling or directionally drilling. The
lessee's belief in and reliance upon the opportunity to produce the oil and
gas under the public lands has been completely extinguished by the NSO
stipulations. Because the nature of their property right is a terminable
lease, the oil and gas lessee's expectancies are completely diminished.
These circumstances will satisfy part two of the Agins/Nollan dis-
junctive test whereby an unjust and uncompensated taking of property
has occurred. If only a few of the leases are revalidated with NSO stipu-
lations, however, enough economically viable use of the leases remain to
preclude a successful takings challenge under either of the Agins/Nollan
tests.
Once a court has determined that a taking has occurred, the govern-
ment may amend the regulation, withdraw the regulation, or exercise its
eminent domain powers.72 No subsequent action, however, relieves the
government of its duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking is effective.73 The BLM would probably not lift the
NSO stipulations on the leases, since to do so would again implicate vio-
lations to NEPA and ESA. Instead, compensation for this regulatory
taking would be granted the lessees based upon an economic formula.
While this remedy mitigates the damage sustained, it does not help the
mineral lessees achieve their wider purpose of exploration for oil and gas
on the federal lands at issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The government may attach NSO stipulations to the exercise of the
lessee's property rights for proper public purposes in three ways. First,
the conditions may be attached at lease issuance with the knowledge and
consent of the lessee. Second, conditions necessary to enforce subse-
quently enacted legislation may be retroactively applied to the existing
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property rights of the lessee. Third, conditions necessary to enforce ex-
isting laws but retroactively applied to valid property interests may be
added to property rights correcting previous procedural errors.
Such a condition agreed to by the lessee at the time of lease issuance
would not give rise to a taking issue. On the other hand, pre-existing
property rights retroactively conditioned by subsequent law have been
the subject of the majority of takings cases encompassing the current
body of law. The same analysis as enunciated in these cases would apply
to the Conner v. Burford facts where procedural error and subsequent
substantive compliance attach conditions to pre-existing rights. The im-
position of these NSO stipulations to the federal oil and gas lessee's pre-
existing property rights may give rise to an unjust taking of property
without compensation if the thresholds of either the Penn Central/Key-
stone balancing test or the Agins/Nollan disjunctive tests can be met.
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